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SUPREME COURT SECTION 1983
DEVELOPMENTS: OCTOBER 1998 TERM
Martin A. Schwartz*
PROF. SCHWARTZ: Good morning. In Monell v. NYC
Department of Social Services,' the Supreme Court of the United
States held for the first time that municipalities are liable under
Section 1983.2 Vast decisional law has developed since 1978 on
issues like municipal liability, qualified immunity, and a range of
other issues. The Supreme Court has devoted an extraordinary
amount of its decision making resources to Section 1983 cases.
There is no question in my mind that the United States Supreme
Court understands the vital nature of Section 1983 litigation and
regards it as a vital part of American law. Section 1983 is the
vehicle that allows individuals to enforce their constitutional rights
against state government, municipal government, state officials,
local officials and other state actors.
The big issue today in the United States Supreme Court is
Federalism. Section 1983 raises, if not always on the surface,
certainly below the surface, federalism issues. Section 1983 is a
*Professor Martin A. Schwartz is highly accomplished in the field of § 1983
litigation and, among other things authored a leading treatise entitled Section
1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses (3d ed. 1997), Section 1983 Litigation:
Federal Evidence (3d ed. 1999) and with Judge George C. Pratt Section 1983
Litigation: Jury Instructions (1999). In addition, Professor Schwartz is the
author of a bi-monthly column in the New York Law Journal, entitled "Public
Interest Law." Professor Schwartz has also been the co-chair of the Practicing
Law Institute annual program on § 1983 litigation for over fifteen years, and is
co-chair of its Supreme Court Review Program. The author acknowledges the
valuable assistance of Faith Levine in the preparation of this article. See
generally IA, 1B, IC MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 1997).
'463 U.S. 658 (1978).242 U.S.C. § 1983. This section provides in part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
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federal congressional remedy authorizing claims for relief against
state and local government. In a very high percentage of the cases,
the Section 1983 battle takes place in the federal courts.
In addition, the Eleventh Amendment often plays a critical role
in Section 1983 litigation. Certainly, the United States Supreme
Court views the Eleventh Amendment as an important federalism
component of the federal Constitution.
Section 1983 cases have also raised a very wide range of
potential issues. Putting aside federalism concerns; questions of
federal statutory interpretation, the meaning of Section 1983,
constitutional interpretation, and sometimes the interplay between
federal law and state law. If you put that whole picture together,
there is certainly a lot that can go on in a Section 1983 action.
Last term, the Supreme Court, rendered a number of important
decisions involving Section 1983 litigation. In terms of the major
Section 1983 cases, I have grouped the cases into four areas. First,
the constitutional rights enforceable under Section 1983. The
Court dealt with cases involving procedural due process,4
substantive due process,5 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 The Court also dealt with a major
case involving state action,7 and a case dealing with the right to
trial by jury.' Finally, the Court rendered an important decision
involving the application of qualified immunity.'
3 u.s. CONST. amend. XI. This section provides in pertinent part: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another state .. .." Id.
4 City of West Covina v. Perkins, 119 S. Ct. 678 (1999).
5 Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 1292 (1999).
6 Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
7 American Manufactures Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. 977, 989
(1999).
I City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 162 (1999).
9 Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
[Vol 16
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SECTION 1983 DEVELOPMENTS
I. Constitutional Rights Enforceable Under § 1983
a) Procedural Due Process
Let me come back to the first area, the constitutional rights that
are enforceable under Section 1983. The Court decided a
procedural due process case called City of West Covina v.
Perkins.0 This case dealt with the question of what is adequate
notice as a matter of procedural due process. The case arose from
a police search of a home owned by a Californian, Mr. Perkins."
The police searched Mr. Perkins' home and seized a revolver and
cash from a boarder staying in his home." When the police were
finished, they left a notice. 3 Mr. Perkins came home and found a
notice, which I will paraphrase, "To whom it may concern we were
here. We had a warrant and we took some property from your
home. There is a list of the property that we took, and if you have
any questions, here are the names of some detectives that you
might try to reach."' 4
The procedural due process issue was whether, when the police
seize a person's property, they are required as a matter of
procedural notice to give the individual information about the
available remedies for recovering the property. 5 The Ninth Circuit
held that the police did have an obligation to provide notice of the
available state law remedies.' 6 The United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that the
police are not obligated as a matter of procedural due process to
give the individual notice of available remedies for recovering the
property, as long as those remedies are set forth in some published
source. 7 What is a published source? It could be a statute or
ordinance or, the Court indicated, even decisional law.'8
1o Perkins, 119 S. Ct. at 678.
" Id. at 679.
121d.
131d. at 679-80.
141d. at 680.
'
5 [d. at 681.
16 See Perkins v. City of West Covina, 113 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 1997).
1 7Perkins, 116 S. Ct. at 682.
I1 Id.
2000 755
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The theory is that the owner of the property can simply, and I am
saying that tongue and cheek, look up the statute, ordinance or
check out the cases, and turn to these public sources and figure out
what the available remedies are. 9 While the Court did not say it in
so in many words, this presumably includes not only what the
remedies are, but the statute of limitations, tolling rules, what you
have to plead, who you have to sue, the filing fee and so on. The
Supreme Court was invoking the "no big deal" theory. It is "no
big deal" for the owner of the property to simply look up the
remedies, turn to the published sources and figure out what the
remedies are. The Court said that the only proviso to that
principle, is that if the available remedies are "arcane," the police
would have to provide notice of available remedies. This got me
to thinking, what if the remedies are in an "arcane" published
source?'0 I suppose if it is in a published source and you can find
the source, then the police do not have to give notice of the
remedies.
In reaching its decision in Perkins, the Court implicitly, or
maybe even explicitly, resolved another procedural due process
issue. If you go back to the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor,2 the
Supreme Court held that when there is deprivation of property or
liberty that comes about as a result of random and unauthorized
official conduct, the availability of an adequate post-deprivation
judicial remedy satisfies procedural due process.2' The Supreme
Court in Perkins said, almost in a self-righteous tone, "We never
held in that line of cases that the state is obligated to provide
information about the available judicial remedies. 23 I would say
that the Court never said the state did not have to provide notice of
the available remedies. The most accurate characterization is that
under the Parratt line of cases this had been an open issue, but that
issue is not open anymore. That issue has been resolved in effect
by the Perkins case.
The decision in Perkins might make some sense if individuals
who seek to recover their property from the police are by and large
19 Id.
20 id.
21 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
22 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540.Id. at 681.
[Vol 16
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individuals who have law school degrees and can figure out their
remedies. However, I do not think that is likely the case. Perkins
represents a very stingy and unrealistic view of procedural due
process. After all, isn't the lay individual likely to have a great
deal of difficulty trying to figure out what the available remedies
are and what they mean? On the other side of the equation,
wouldn't it be very easy for the police to add information to the
form notice that they are already required to leave with the
property owner describing the property that has been taken? To
me, the balance of interests clearly favors the individual. It is
somewhat baffling that not one of the nine Justices on the Supreme
Court even thought to weigh the competing interests in this
manner.
b) Substantive Due Process
The second constitutional right is substantive due process, which
was at issue in Conn v. Gabbert.2' This case arose out of the
Menendez brothers' criminal prosecution in California. The
District Attorney who was prosecuting the Menendez brothers
learned that Lyle Menendez had written a letter to his girlfriend,
Tracy Baker.' The police suspected that in this letter, Lyle
Menendez wrote, "If you are called to testify at my criminal trial,
lie."26  The District Attorney wanted to get this letter, so he
subpoenaed Tracy Baker to appear before the grand jury. 7 The
District Attorney directed her to produce the letter, but Ms. Baker
informed the District Attorney that she had turned the letter over to
her attorney, Paul Gabbert."8 When Tracy Baker appeared before
the grand jury, the prosecutor, who had secured a search warrant,
arranged to have Paul Gabbert searched in a room in the
courthouse.29  Upon being searched, Mr. Gabbert produced the
letter and turned it over to the prosecutor." Ms. Baker claimed that
24 119 S. Ct. 1292 (1999).
25 Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1294.
26id.
271d
28Id.
29id.
30 Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1294.
2000
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the timing of the search of her attorney, Mr. Gabbert, prevented her
from consulting with him during the grand jury proceeding.3
Mr. Gabbert brought suit under Section 1983, alleging that
subjecting him to a search, while his client was testifying, violated
his substantive due process right to practice his profession." The
Ninth Circuit agreed with him and held that the action of the
prosecutor, in having him searched, did violate his substantive due
practice right to practice law.33 In fact, the Ninth Circuit said that
because the search violated his clearly established substantive due
process right to practice law, the defendants were not even
protected by qualified immunity.3 4 What do you think the United
States Supreme Court held? It unanimously reversed the Ninth
Circuit decision and held that the search did not violate Mr.
Gabbert's substantive due process right to practice his profession.3 5
In addition, there was a Fourth Amendment claim in the case, but
the Supreme Court said the Fourth Amendment claim was not
properly before them.36
One of the interesting aspects in Conn, is that the Court did
acknowledge that there are Supreme Court precedents that have
established a substantive due process right to practice one's trade
or profession, but the Court said that those cases were
distinguishable.37 In those cases, the individual was complaining
about a complete prohibition of the right to practice a trade or
profession, and even in the context of a complete prohibition, the
Court said that could be justified if the government had a
legitimate governmental interest.3"
3 1 id.
32 Id.
33 Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1294. (citing Gabbert v. Conn, 131 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.
1997)).
34 id.
35 Conn, 131 F.3d at 1295-96.
36 Id. at 1297. (Stevens, concurring) (stating that the question of "whether
petitioners may have violated the Fourth Amendment because their method of
conducting the search was arguably unreasonable" is not "squarely presented
and argued by petitioners in this court). Id.
37 Id. at 1294-95. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957); Trvax v. Reich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114 (1889).
38 Conn, 119 S. Ct. at 1294-95.
[Vol 16
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In Conn, Mr. Gabbert complained about what the Supreme
Court described as a brief interruption of his right to practice his
profession, his right to practice law." The Court said that in the
scheme of things, because this type of brief interruption by
government is inevitable, it does not implicate substantive due
process.4 If the timing of the search was intended to interfere with
the ability of the client to consult with her attomey,4 - I think that
the thinking here by the Supreme Court is that it is inevitable that
the government is going to engage in action which might briefly or
temporarily interrupt one's practice of a profession, and these brief
interruptions cannot be turned into substantive due process claims
every time they happen.
Mr. Gabbert also argued that the search was conducted in an
unreasonable manner. The Court held that such a claim must be
based on the Fourth Amendment, not upon substantive due
process.4 3 This is a theme that the Court has played out a number
of times over the last ten years or so. I think of it as a type of
constitutional preemption theory. In effect, what the Supreme
Court is saying is, where an individual is given protection under a
textually explicit part of the Constitution, like the Fourth
Amendment the individual can only look to that part of the
Constitution for protection, and can not rely upon the more general
doctrine of substantive due process.'
c) Privileges and Immunities Clause
The third right that the Court dealt with is the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The Supreme
Court has almost never applied this Clause. It has not been
39 Id. at 1292.
40 Id. at 1295-96.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1296. (holding that the "Fourteenth Amendment right to practice one's
calling is not violated by the execution of a search warrant whether calculated to
annoy or even to prevent consultation with a grand jury witness").43 id.
4 See, e.g. Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 786 (1989).
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in
pertinent part: "No State shall make or employ any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Id.
2000 759
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invoked in a hundred years, and it has only been mentioned in two
or three Supreme Court cases. In Saenz v. Roe,4 the Court
resurrected the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.47  The Court invalidated a California law that
provided for a lower level of public assistance benefits for families
who recently moved into the State of California." In its first year
of residence in California, the family was limited to receiving only
the amount of assistance that the family was eligible to receive in
the state from which the family came. This was typically a lower
amount of assistance than was available to the long-term residents
of California.49
If we go back to Shapiro v. Thompson,5" the Court held that a
one-year durational residency requirement for public assistance
eligibility violated the constitutionally protected right of interstate
travel.5' Under a one-year durational residency requirement, the
family does not receive any benefits during that first year in
residence." The result in the Saenz case, holding the California
lower level of benefits provision to be unconstitutional, follows
rather logically from the Supreme Court's decision in Shapiro v.
Thompson. 3 What took the legal community and the media by
complete surprise was the Supreme Court's reliance on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
46 119 S. Ct. 1518(1999).
47 Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1521.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1522. Each of the three plaintiffs in the Saenz case alleged that her
monthly AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependant Children) grant for the first
twelve months, after moving to California to escape abusive homes, would be
substantially lower under the new California statute. Specifically, "the former
residents of Louisiana and Oklahoma would receive $190 and $341 respectively
for a family of three even though the full California grant was $641; the former
resident of Colorado, who had just one child, was limited to $280 a month as
opposed to the full California grant of $504 for a family of two." Id.
50 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
5' Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. See also U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58.
"The constitutional right to travel from one state to another...occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been
firmly established and repeatedly recognized." Id. at 630.52 SaenZ, 119 S. Ct. at 1522.
5' 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
760 [Vol 16
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The decision in the Saenz case does not mention Section 1983,
but I went back and traced the lower court decisions, and sure
enough, this case was brought under Section 1983.' This raised a
question in my mind: is Saenz now a one-shot deal where we have
this decision under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or are we going to see a new wave of
Section 1983 litigation under the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment? At present there is no way to know
the answer to that question.
H. State Action
The second area where the Supreme Court made an important
Section 1983 decision was the area of state action. State action is a
threshold question for making a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment; no state action means no Fourteenth Amendment
claim.' I'm going to be exceedingly brief on this issue, because
we have a whole segment on state action later this morning.
In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v.
Sullivan"6 a Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation program was
administered partly by private insurance companies."' The Court
held that when private insurance companies decide to withhold or
suspend Workers' Compensation benefits for medical expenses,
pending review by a utilization review committee, the decision by
the insurance company to suspend payment of benefits does not
constitute state action.58 Of course, no state action means that the
insurance companies do not have to comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 9
54 Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998).
55See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
56 119 S. Ct. 977 (1999).
57Sullivan, 119 S Ct. at 977.581d. at 985-86.
59 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3.
2000
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UI. Right to Trial by Jury
The third subject area is right to a jury trial on a regulatory
takings claim. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes," a
developer in the City of Monterey applied to the city for
permission to develop its property, but the city said, "Your
proposal is too big, scale it down."'" The developer scaled down
the proposal and submitted a second application.62 What did the
city say? Still too big, scale it down some more.63 Well, this went
on for five years, nineteen applications, each of which was denied.
So, after five years and nineteen applications, the developer sued
under a regulatory takings claim."
The action was brought in the district court, and the district
judge not only impaneled a jury, but submitted the regulatory
takings claim to the jury. The jury came back with a verdict of one
and a half million dollars compensatory damage for the developer.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.65 What did the Supreme Court do?
Do not jump to conclusions. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit." The main issue for the Supreme
Court was whether there is a right to a jury trial on a Section 1983
60 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
61 City of Monterey, 119 S. Ct. at 1632.
62 id.
63 Id. Beginning in 1983 the landowners submitted several proposals to
"develop the property in conformance with the city's zoning and general plan
requirements." Id. The landowners limited their proposal to 344 residential
units for the entire parcel although the zoning requirement allowed for more
than 1000 units. After complying with the city planning commission's repeated
requests to scale down the development to 263 units in 1982, 224 units in 1983,
and 190 units in 1984, the landowner's proposals were consistently rejected. In
late 1984, the council finally approved one of the site plans under a conditional
permit. However, in 1986, two months before the permit was to expire, the
council denied the landowners' final plans for development. Id.
64 See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission. v. Hamilton Bank
of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985). (ripeness of regulatory takings claims).
65 Id. at 1634.
66 Id. at 1645.
[Vol 16
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regulatory takings claim.67 By a five to four decision, the Supreme
Court held that there was a right to a jury trial.6S
One of the interesting things to me about this decision is that
although the original version of Section 1983 goes back to 1871
and this is the first time, as far as I have been able to figure out, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that there is a right to
a jury trial in a federal court Section 1983 action. The Supreme
Court reasoned that although Section 1983 itself does not authorize
jury trials, the Seventh Amendment grants a right to jury trial in
civil cases where the amount and controversy is at least $20.
The court in City of Monterey reasoned that a regulatory takings
claim seeking just compensation is roughly analogous to a claim
for compensatory damages.69  An action for compensatory
damages is an action at law within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment.7' Once the United States Supreme Court held that
there was a right to a jury trial on plaintiffs Section 1983
regulatory takings claim, the next question was what issues were
properly submitted to the jury?
Judge Pratt mentioned the research we have been doing on jury
instructions, and in doing this research, it struck me that this may
be somewhat of a neglected area of constitutional law: winch
issues should the judge give to the jury? We could currently say
that the jury should get questions of fact, the judge should retain
questions of law, but it is not always obvious what is a question of
law for the Court and what is a question of fact for the jury.
For example, in public employee free speech retaliation cases,
the question of whether the employer acted with a retaliatory
motive is clearly a factual question for the jury. However, one of
the issues in these cases is the Pickering' balancing test. It
involves balancing the employee's free speech interest and the
government's interest in efficient governmental operations.'
There obviously can be factual issues surrounding this Pickering
67id.
68ld. at 1637.
69 Williamson, 473 U.S at 1639. "As the name suggests... just compensation
is, like ordinary money damages, a compensatory remedy." Id.70 id.
71 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
72d. at 568.
76.32000
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balancing test, especially with respect to the effect of the
employee's speech on efficient governmental operations." The
question then becomes, who decides these factual questions? The
lower courts are split on this issue. Some courts say it is a factual
issue, so what should happen here is that the judge should ask the
jury to decide the factual issue, and then the judge would actually
do the balancing of the competing interests. Other courts have held
that these factual issues are issues for the judge, because they are
questions of what the Fourth Circuit called "constitutional facts."'74
Coming back to City of Monterey,75 the Supreme Court held that,
because the developer's regulatory takings claim was rather fact
specific, there was no error in submitting that claim to the jury.76
Actually, there were two separate issues submitted to the jury.
One issue submitted to the jury was whether the developer was
deprived of all economically viable use of the property. That
comes out of the Lucas' case. The Court said whether the
developer was deprived of all economically viable use of the
property is a predominantly factual issue.78 There was no problem
in submitting that question to the jury. The second question
submitted to the jury was a closer call. The jury was asked to
decide whether the city's land use decision denying the developer
the right to develop its property substantially advanced a legitimate
governmental interest; the instructions gave the jury a definition of
substantial governmental interest.79 The Supreme Court was a little
7' Id. at 568-69.
4 See, e.g., Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 830 (1987).
75 City of Monterey, 119 S. Ct. at 1624.
761d. at 1643.
77Lucas v. South Carolina*Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1083 (1992).
78 City of Monterey, 119 S. Ct. at 1643.791d. at 1634. The district court gave the following jury instruction:
The regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially advance a
legitimate public purpose if the action bears a reasonable relationship to
that objective. Now, if the preponderance of the evidence establishes
that there was no reasonable relationship between the city's denial of the
... proposal and legitimate public purpose, you should find in favor of
the plaintiff. If you find that there existed a reasonable relationship
between the city's decision and a legitimate public purpose, you should
find in favor of the city. As long as the regulatory action by the city
[Vol 16
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more tentative here and said this issue is probably best described as
a mixed question of law and fact. This was a tougher call because
there is a legal aspect to this particular issue, but the Supreme
Court said that because the developer's claim was so heavily
dependent upon the facts, there was no error submitting it to the
jury.s
Let me make two points about City of Monterey. First, I think
that Justice Scalia's concurring opinion is very important because
he urged the Court to find a right to a jury trial, not just with
respect to a Section 1983 regulatory takings claim, but on any
claim that seeks compensatory damages.8  I think that the
language of the majority opinion supports the recognition of the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in any federal court action
under Section 1983 seeking compensatory damages. The other
point is the lineup of the Justices, which is interesting. On one
level this case is about what the Seventh Amendment means, but
then how is it that all the conservative justices lined up in the
majority and voted to find a right to a jury trial? So the speculation
among legal analysts and the media was that the more conservative
members of the Supreme Court, the so-called vigilant protectors of
property, believe that juries are probably likely to award greater
amounts of compensation on regulatory takings claims than judges
in bench trials.
IV. Qualified Immunity
Let me come to the last issue: qualified immunity. Most
officials who are sued for damages under Section 1983 and can
assert the defense of qualified immunity. I think that this is the
most important issue in Section 1983 litigation. This issue
resolves a very high proportion of Section 1983 claims, and I
would go further and say that it resolves a quite high proportion of
Section 1983 claims in favor of the defendant. The critical issue
when this defense is asserted, is whether the defendant violated
substantially advances their legitimate public purpose... its underlying
motives and reasons are not to be inquired into.
Id.
8o Id.
1 Id. at 1650.
2000 765
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clearly established federal law. As long as the plaintiffs
constitutional rights were not clearly established, the official will
be immunized from personal liability. 2 This is a very potent
defense, and sometimes plaintiffs' lawyers do not appreciate how
potent this defense is. Remember this is not just a defense from
liability, but also an immunity from suit." This is an immunity
from the burdens of even having to defend the action, even having
to go to trial and maybe even having to participate in discovery.
That's rather extraordinary if you think about it. We understand
immunity from liability, but immunity from discovery, immunity
from trial, that's somewhat of a new concept. I was thinking of the
Eric Segal line in "Love Story:" Love means never having to say
you're sorry. The analogy in qualified immunity is never having to
defend the merits of the case.
The question is how do courts determine whether the federal law
was clearly established? The Supreme Court spoke to this issue in
Wilson v. Layne. 4 You might remember that this was a highly
publicized case in which the Court rendered a unanimous Fourth
Amendment ruling that police action that invites the media along
to observe and to record the execution of a warrant in the home
violated the Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court held that the police
action violated the Fourth Amendment because the manner in
which the warrant was executed was unreasonable. When it came
to the issue of liability and the defense of qualified immunity, the
Court, by an eight to one vote, held that the defendant officials
were protected from personal liability by qualified immunity. The
82 Anderson v. Creighton, 84 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982).
83 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
' 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999).
85 Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1694. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment
rights of homeowners were violated when police brought third parties or
members of the media "into their home during the execution of a warrant when
the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of a warrant
execution." Id. The Fourth Amendment is the embodiment of "centuries-old
principles of respect for the privacy of the home, which apply where.., police
enter a home under the authority of an arrest warrant in order to take into
custody the suspect named in the warrant. It does not necessarily follow from
the fact that the officers were entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer
with them. The Fourth Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a
warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion." Id.
[Vol 16
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Court reasoned that in 1992, when the warrant was executed,
Fourth Amendment law did not clearly prohibit the so-called
media tag-alongs or media ride-alongs.86
The Court in Wilson provided us guidance about how to evaluate
whether federal law was clearly established. The Supreme Court
has been talking about the standard of clearly established federal
law since the 1982 decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald," but has said
preciously little about how courts should go about making the
evaluation as to whether the federal law was clearly established.
A few points that I think are of particular interest. The Court
said in Wilson that when this incident took place, there was no
precedent of what the Supreme Court called a "controlling
jurisdiction" holding this type of police action violative of the
Fourth Amendment.8 Controlling jurisdiction means a decision of
either the United States Supreme Court, of the particular Circuit, or
of the highest court in the state. The Court said that absent such
precedent, the likelihood is that the federal law is not clearly
established. 9 It is not set forth as an absolute rule, but a high
likelihood. The Supreme Court also stated that after the incident in
this case, a split developed in the Circuit Courts over the
constitutionality of these media ride-alongs.' The Supreme Court
said that a split in the Circuit Courts is a very strong indicator that
the federal law was not clearly established.9' After all, if federal
judges can not agree on what the Fourth Amendment means, why
should a court impose the liability on the poor law enforcement
official who also cannot figure out what the Fourth Amendment
means.' In addition, the Supreme Court looked at the strength of
86 Id. at 1700. "Accurate media coverage of police activities serves an
important public purpose, and it is not obvious from the general principles of the
Fourth Amendment that the conduct of the officers in this case violated the
Amendment . . . although media ride-alongs of one sort or another had
apparently become a common police practice, in 1992 there were no judicial
opinions holding that this practice became unlawful when it entered a home."
Id.
87 457 U.S. 800 (1982). (rejecting a claim that high presidential aides are
entitled to absolute presidential immunity).
88 Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1700.
89 Id.
9°Id. at 1701.
91 Id.
92id.
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the argument on the merits made by the defendants.93 The Court
said there was some substance to the arguments being made by the
law enforcement officers, and that the result was not obvious. This
too becomes a factor in the evaluation as to whether the federal law
was clearly established.94
Justice Stevens dissented on this point, questioning that, in all
the years that he had been on the Court, how many times has the
United States Supreme Court held that police action violates the
Fourth Amendment?95 Furthermore, how many times has the
Supreme Court held unanimously, that the police action violates
the Fourth Amendment?96 The fact that this was a unanimous
decision upholding a Fourth Amendment claim demonstrated that
the federal law in fact was clearly established. As for the lack of
controlling precedent, he pointed out that the most obvious cases,
involving the most egregious government wrongdoing, do not even
arise.97
Thank you very much.
9 Wilson, 119 S. Ct. at 1700-01.94 1d. at 1699.
95 Id. at 1702. Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part with the
Court's holding, stating that "in its decision today the Court has not announced a
new rule of constitutional law. Rather, it has refused to recognize an entirely
unp3recedented request for an exception to a well-established principle." Id.
"Id.
971d. at 1702.
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